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14. ABSTRACT Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) operations are listed as a core mission in multiple service and joint doctrinal publication. Analysis of successful military and non-military cooperation in HA/DR operations illuminates several elements of operational art which are more necessary than in conventional military operations. Two case studies, European Union Operation ATALANTA to provide relief to Somalia and US Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE in Haiti, are analyzed in terms of objectives, command structure, operational leadership, and command and control systems. Insights on these elements highlight the importance of the specific elements, operational objectives, leadership, and knowledge management/information management (KM/IM) best practices. Finally, the paper draws conclusions for US GCC and JTF commanders executing HA/DR operations and for joint terminology to avoid problems in cooperation.					
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**NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R.I.**

**Creating “Common Space” in Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief: Best
practices for the Operational Commander to ensure unity of effort between military
and non-military organizations**

by

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**A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the
requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.**

**The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily
endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.**

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Abstract

Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) operations are listed as a core mission in multiple service and joint doctrinal publication. Analysis of successful military and non-military cooperation in HA/DR operations illuminates several elements of operational art which are more necessary than in conventional military operations. Two case studies, European Union Operation ATALANTA to provide relief to Somalia and US Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE in Haiti, are analyzed in terms of objectives, command structure, operational leadership, and command and control systems. Insights on these elements highlight the importance of the specific elements, operational objectives, leadership, and knowledge management/information management (KM/IM) best practices. Finally, the paper draws conclusions for US GCC and JTF commanders executing HA/DR operations and for joint terminology to avoid problems in cooperation.

Introduction

Of the seven basic conflicts in literary fiction, that of *man against nature* will continue to happen in reality regardless of any change in the interaction of human societies. The recent 2011 earthquake and tsunami disaster in Japan remind one that even highly developed states can fall victim to disaster and require vast amounts of humanitarian aid. Pervasive media and the penetration of information technologies ever deeper into society highlights human suffering and places pressure on governments to act to relieve it. Concurrently, economic upheaval worldwide is leading to greater reduction of both civilian governmental functions and military strength. Not only is the imperative to conduct humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) operations demonstrated by the mercurial nature of the natural world, but the theme is threaded throughout US national security strategies, military strategies, and combatant commander posture statements guide what the operational commander must be prepared to do. While military forces are often tasked to conduct HA/DR operations, other non-government actors often seek to fill the same role.

Historian and Army veteran Dr. James Carafano lists nine principles for undertaking

Table I:Principles for Action in Undertaking Complex Activities	
Principles of Process	1 Develop Human Capital
	2 Create Common Space
	3 Fight the Fog of Peace
Principles of Purpose	4 Determine clear, concise national objectives
	5 Establish interagency cooperation
	6 Ensure unity of effort
Principles of Peace	7 Understand the country
	8 Delegitimize bad ideas
	9 Create credible alternatives and the will to prevail

complex activities listed in Table I.¹ The common thread through all of these principles and their achievement is creating

¹James Carafano, “Learning from the Past and Leaning Forward: Principles for Action in Undertaking Complex Activities,” in *Stability Operations and State-Building: Continuities and Contingencies*, ed Greg Kaufman (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, October 2008), 171 - 177.

“common space” between all actors in an HA/DR environment where both actions and information can be communicated and synchronized. Much of the literature written over the last ten years about military/non-military cooperation has focused on the need for institutional change or redirection of resources. That discussion is strategic in nature and not helpful for the operational commander tasked to conduct HA/DR in a crisis. This paper will assume that operational commanders and staffs must work with the tools they have on hand. The military operational commander cannot have “command” of NGOs and certain IGOs instead, the joint commander must strive for unity of effort in HA/DR operations.

To have greater unity of effort in HA/DR operations there must be clear, limited objectives, energetic operational leadership, and robust knowledge and information management systems. More than before, military/non-military unity of effort in HA/DR operations is happening. Future operational commanders can gain insight into best practices through analysis of current cases. European Union (EU) Operation ATALANTA and US Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE both demonstrate how military organizations can effectively participate with civilian organizations in HA/DR operations over both short and long durations.

Counter-arguments

The primary obstacle to cooperation between military and non-military organizations is policy. By their form and function, military forces exist to implement the policy of a government with some degree of violence or threat of it. NGOs exist primarily with the sole idea that they will try to implement policies independent of government.² Thus the ability of the military to find common ground with non-military forces can be very limited.

² JP 1-02 defines an NGO as “nongovernmental organization — A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic

Another significant obstacle to military-NGO cooperation can be the security environment in the area of operations. Military organizations are optimized for short duration operations focusing on security and combat. Military organizations will by nature of their function be used by governments to gain security. NGOs operate for long durations in environments of insecurity and continue operations before, during, and after conflict. NGOs have both a symbiotic and opposing role to military forces in hostile areas. While military forces can protect NGO members to enable NGO aid operations, the very presence of military forces can draw violence towards NGOs by creating a militaristic signature.³ If threats are not present or relatively low, it is easier for military organizations to cooperate with NGOs. Because of this dichotomy of security and instability, NGOs are conflicted about their role with regards to military forces. Independence is a key principle in the United States Institute for Peace's (USIP) *Guidelines for Relations Between US Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organizations*. These guidelines were developed in 2007 after a two year partnership between USIP, DoD, and Inter Action, a coalition of NGOs.⁴ The *Guidelines* document codifies the obstacles to military-NGO cooperation to gain unity of effort. Generally, NGOs want to remain impartial during stability operations to maintain this independence that prevents their being targeted. Thus, by form and function, security versus instability, and NGO doctrine, military to non-military cooperation would seem to be a difficult state at which to arrive.

development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. Also called **NGO**. (JP 3-08).

³ Eric James, “NGO’s & the Military: Old, New, and Blurred Lines,” (white paper, Australian Aid International, 27 January 2007), <http://www.aai.org.au/resources/index.html> under “Publications” (accessed 11 April 2011), 3-5.

⁴ United States Institute for Peace, *Guidelines for Relations Between US Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organizations in Hostile or Potentially Hostile Environments*, Practitioner Tool (Washington, DC: USIP, July 2007) <http://www.usip.org/publications/guidelines-relations-between-us-armed-forces-and-nghos-hostile-or-potentially-hostile-envi> (accessed 1 April 2011), 1-2.

However, analysis of current HA/DR operations offers a different story. Given the fundamental differences that separate military and NGOs, cooperation depends on carefully defining objectives, roles, and interfaces. Of the two case studies presented, Operation ATALANTA will demonstrate that for long duration missions, clear and limited operational objectives allow military forces to have well-crafted mandates and create cooperative organizations which gain the operational leader unity of effort. For *ad hoc*, short duration operations, such as Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE, operational leadership and the ability to communicate and share information matter more than objectives and mandates.

Additionally, the information environment has significantly changed with the advent of Web 2.0 since the founding of many NGOs. Web 2.0 is the phenomenon of a change to user created content versus a corporate or webmaster created content.⁵ User-created content provides a platform for any user to modify the content of the page or upload information.⁶ This increased access to information has changed the ability of military and non-military organizations to collaborate. More recent examples of HA/DR operations are helpful when examining successful operations in light of this more comprehensive information environment. NGOs have pioneered in the field of communications technology to allow collaboration in HA/DR operations. Operation ATALANTA around Somalia, from 2008 to the present, and Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE in Haiti, January to June 2010, illustrate best practices for a joint force commander executing HA/DR operations.

⁵ Tom Funk, *Web 2.0 and Beyond: Understanding the New Online Business Models, Trends, and Technologies* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2009), xiii-xvii.

⁶ Mark Drapeau and Linton Wells II, “Social Software and National Security: An Initial Net Assessment” April 2009, available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ndu/social_software_and_nat_sec.pdf, (accessed 31 August 2010). 1.

OPERATION ATALANTA

Operation ATALANTA is a major joint maritime operation in which multiple inter-governmental organizations cooperate to counter piracy off the Horn of Africa (HOA) and deliver aid to Somalia. Operation ATALANTA began as a European response to the ending of NATO's Operation ALLIED PROTECTOR.⁷ As NATO transitioned its forces around the HOA to the purely anti-piracy Operation OCEAN SHEILD, UN World Food Program (WFP) vessels moving food to Somalia were left without a security provider. The EU's decision to begin ATALANTA had a fundamental element of humanitarian assistance in that it began as a mission to protect humanitarian aid. From the perspective of HA/DR cooperation, it is particularly significant as an example of IGO to IGO cooperation involving military forces of one IGO (EU) and the relief forces of another IGO (World Food Program, a component of the UN). In this case, both IGOs must balance their objectives, mandates, and methods to ensure that all member states of both IGOs can participate.

EU Naval Forces-Somalia (EUNAVFOR) provides the security, reconnaissance, and coordination to allow IGO vessels to deliver aid and other shipping to safely transit around the Horn of Africa. The WFP is one of the largest logistics organizations in the world and the world's largest humanitarian organization.⁸ WFP brings the capability to feed massive amounts of people in Somalia. Through multiple sea lines of communication (SLOCs) and intermediate staging bases in Mombasa and Djibouti WFP ships bring 90% percent of all aid

⁷ Lauren Ploch, Christopher M. Blanchard, Ronald O'Rourke, R. Chuck Mason, and Rawle O. King, *Piracy off the Horn of Africa* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 28 September 2009), 20-21, and NATO Shipping Center, "Operation Ocean Shield," http://www.manw.nato.int/page_operation_ocean_shield.aspx (accessed 1 April 2011).

⁸ World Food Program Logistics, "The World Food Program Logistics Portal," <http://logistics.wfp.org/content/the-wfp-logistics-portal>, (accessed 1 April 2011).

to Somalia by the sea.⁹ Since OPERATION ATALANTA began in 2008, the WFP has brought 500,000 tons of food to Somalia under EUNAVFOR guard.¹⁰ WFP also brings the ability to coordinate with multiple NGOs on the ground in Somalia. As an aid organization inside the UN, the WFP *looks* more like the NGOs in Somalia and can more easily interface between military forces (EUNAVFOR) and NGOs to distribute aid.

Notable to the unity of effort are the objectives in OPERATION ATALANTA. EU stated objectives began with:

- 1) The protection of vessels of the WFP delivering food aid to displaced persons in Somalia, in accordance with the mandate laid down in UNSC Resolution 1814 (2008),
- 2) The protection of vulnerable vessels cruising off the Somali coast, and the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast, in accordance with the mandate laid down in UNSC Resolution 1816 (2008),¹¹

In 2009 a third objective was added to OPERATION ATALANTA:

- 3) In addition, ATALANTA shall contribute to the monitoring of fishing activities off the coast of Somalia.¹²

Relief of human suffering and protection of maritime trade are objectives upon which most states participating in world affairs can easily agree. Operation ATALANTA's

⁹World Food Program Logistics, "MAP-Somalia Logistics - Pipeline Jan-Jun 2009," <http://www.logcluster.org/ops/som/map-center/logistics-pipeline-january-to-june-2009> (accessed 1 April 2011) and World Food Program Logistics, "Somalia Country Operation Overview" <http://logistics.wfp.org/country-operations/africa/east/somalia> (accessed 1 April 2011).

¹⁰ EU NAVFOR, "EU NAVFOR: OPERATION ATALANTA Media Information Guide," (29 March 2011), under "Downloads," <http://www.eunavfor.eu/downloads/> (accessed 29 March 2011), 4.

¹¹ European Union, "COUNCIL JOINT ACTION 2008/851/CFSP of 10 November 2008 on a European Union military operation to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast," (Brussels, Belgium: Council of the European Union, 11 November 2008), 2, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:301:0033:0037:EN:PDF> (accessed 25 March 2011).

¹² European Union, " COUNCIL DECISION 2009/907/CFSP of 8 December 2009 amending Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP on a European Union military operation to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast," (Brussels, Belgium: Council of the European Union, 8 December 2009), 1, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:322:0027:0027:EN:PDF> (accessed 25 March 2011).

objectives are limited in scope. Consequently, CTF 465's (EUNAVFOR's tactical forces around the HOA) rules of engagement (ROE) are limited to self-defense, defense of WFP ships, and capture and destruction of only positively identified pirate vessels.¹³ These objectives and limited ROE give strength to the EU operation. Since the EU as an organized body developed its policy, strategy, objectives and ROE as a body, member nations can be more efficient executing operations than if the operation had been put together ad hoc.

Because of clear objectives and ROE, the operational command structure becomes much easier for the operational leadership to manage. Strategic political and military leadership for EU operations rests in the Political Security Committee (PSC) and European Union Military Committee (EUMC). The PSC exercises political control of operations and is reported to by the EUMC, who manages military operations.¹⁴ While other political and military structures of the EU can be very dense and confusing, the operational command organization for Operation ATALANTA was made very clear. The EU Military Staff (EUMS) is the organization that staffs decisions made by the policy bodies. EUMS Chief of Staff Lieutenant General David Leakey understands that it is not the operational headquarters for EU NAVFOR actions:

"...we don't get sucked down to the tactical level because if we did that we'd never dig ourselves out of rabbit holes...[s]o we have to keep ourselves at the political-strategic level. But even then we have to be quite selective and only do conceptual work where it is going to enable EU military or civil and military operations..."¹⁵

¹³Sean Boyne, "EU force seeks "eyes in the sky" as pirates head east," *Janes Navy International*, 22 April 2010, <http://search.janes.com> (accessed 25 March 2011).

¹⁴ EU NAVFOR, "EU NAVFOR: OPERATION ATALANTA Media Information Guide," (29 March 2011), under "Downloads," <http://www.eunavfor.eu/downloads/> (accessed 29 March 2011), 2.

¹⁵ Gerrard Cowan, "Interview: Lieutenant General David Leakey, Chief of the EU Military Staff," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 2 June 2009, <http://search.janes.com> (accessed 25 March 2011).

OPERATION ATALANTA has an operational command post at Northwood, England, and a tactical command post in the area of operations.¹⁶ Additionally, the operational commander is specified in the EU Act as the contact point for the UN General Secretariat, WFP, and ship owner's organizations.¹⁷ With this ability, the operational commander and staff are much more connected to the "users" of their service than coordination authority was maintained at a higher level, such as the EUMC or PSC.

With multiple interactions of civil, military, and government organizations, knowledge and information management (KM/IM) is fundamental to the success of Operation ATALANTA. EUNAVFOR conducts KM/IM through a variety of means. Initially EUMC stood up a EUNAVFOR coordination cell to communicate with NATO and US forces in the HOA. As the EUNAVFOR operational headquarters gained full operational capacity, coordination responsibility shifted directly to the operational headquarters.¹⁸ EUNAVFOR at Northwood uses a new "EU Secret" Operational Command system with 197 workstations and connectivity to other like systems throughout Europe.¹⁹ This internal IM structure allows the Operational commander to communicate with subordinates in the theater.

To enable communication with shipping, EUMC and EUNAVFOR created the Maritime Security Center-Horn of Africa (MSC-HOA). MSC-HOA is a website with the most current data on conditions around the Horn of Africa. Shipping can register online with MSC-HOA. From the MSC-HOA site, mariners can also get "Best Management Practices,"

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ European Union, "COUNCIL JOINT ACTION 2008/851/CFSP of 10 November 2008," (Brussels, Belgium: Council of the European Union, 11 November 2008), 4.

¹⁸ Common Security and Defense Policy, "European Union military coordination of action against piracy in Somalia (EU NAVCO)," (19 September 2008). Under "Factsheets, 19.09.2008 ,"

<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=1521&lang=EN> (accessed 29 March 2011).

¹⁹ Jane's Information Group, "EU Operational HQ CIS," *Jane's C4I Systems*, 9 August 2010, <http://search.janes.com> (accessed 25 March 2011).

EUNAVFOR's tactical guidance for anti-piracy measures, and the latest news on operations in the ATALANTA area of operations.²⁰

Operation ATALANTA is an extremely effective model of IGO to IGO cooperation that enables unity of effort for the operational commander in an HA operation. Through clear objectives, operational and tactical forces gained clear command structures and ROE. A variety of KM/IM systems and processes allow all users of information to gain common understanding. The success of the operation with regards to humanitarian assistance is demonstrated by the continuing ability of WFP ships to enter Mogadishu's port and deliver food.

OPERATION UNIFIED RESPONSE

Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE was the United States Government (USG) response to the January 2010 Haitian earthquake disaster. UNIFIED RESPONSE was a major joint maritime and land operation to conduct disaster relief. Differing from Operation ATALANTA, UNIFIED RESPONSE was a short duration disaster relief operation with the lead USG agency being the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Operations in Haiti were conducted with cooperation between IGOs (WFP), NGOs, USAID, other militaries and Joint Task Force-Haiti (JTF-H).

Both US military forces and NGOs brought specific needed capabilities to the Haitian disaster relief efforts. US military capabilities to operate the airport, conduct Joint Logistics Over the Shore (JLOTS), and air mobility were the key capabilities needed for Haitian relief operations.²¹ US forces' ability to use fixed wing and UAV ISR capabilities throughout the

²⁰ EUNAVFOR Somalia, "Maritime Security Center – Horn of Africa," <http://www.mschoa.org/> (accessed 8 April 2011).

²¹ Sam LaGrone, "Natural disaster, manmade response: US assets dominate Haiti relief effort," *Jane's Navy International*, 22 February 2010, <http://search.janes.com> (accessed 25 March 2011).

first months of the disaster response gave much greater visibility across the scope of the disaster.²² Finally, US naval forces provided vital initial capability to conduct air traffic coordination using air defense radars.²³

While military forces provided vast lift and control assets, NGOs in Haiti brought key niche capabilities to facilitate the response. A growing segment of the NGOs spectrum are those NGOs that use technology to enable HA/DR. The generic term *Information and Communications Technologies* (ICT) applies to these innovations that allow data from various types of platforms and users to be meshed into useable formats. *Mashups* are programs and software of dissimilar types linked together to create differently formatted information as a means to share information.²⁴ NGOs such as Innovative Support to Emergencies, Diseases, and Disasters (InSTEDD) and ICT4Peace seek to create ICTs to facilitate disaster and humanitarian relief.²⁵ *Mashup* ICTs such as *Ushahidi* and *Mesh4x*, created by InSTEDD, meld map data with a wide variety of field data from computers and cell phones.²⁶ InSTEDD has used its various ICTs since 2006 in the Mekong Basin, Mexico, the US Center for Disease Control, and Bangladesh to monitor and disseminate information on disease and natural disasters.²⁷ The KM/IM architecture used in Haiti owed a great deal to these open NGO systems as demonstrated further in the case study.

²² Joint Center for Operational Analysis, “Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE Haiti Earthquake Response,” Powerpoint Presentation, May 2010.

²³ Lee Willet, “National Crises and the Utility of Naval Power: The Haiti Case Study,” Royal United Services Institute, <http://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref:C4B7AA93779157/> (accessed 14 April 2011).

²⁴ Tom Funk, *Web 2.0 and Beyond: Understanding the New Online Business Models, Trends, and Technologies* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2009), 147.

²⁵ ICT4Peace Foundation, “ICT4Peace Foundation: Who We Are,” <http://ict4peace.org/whoweare>, (accessed 01 October 10), and Eric Rasmussen, “InSTEDD Fact Sheet,” 29 May 2009, <http://ceo.instedd.org/2009/05/little-information-about-instedd.html>, (accessed 15 September 10), 1.

²⁶ Patrick Meier, “Read This If You Don’t Know What Ushahidi Is,” <http://blog.ushahidi.com/index.php/2010/06/28/read-this-if-you-don%e2%80%99t-know-what-ushahidi-is/>, (accessed 31 August 2010), and Rasmussen, “InSTEDD Fact Sheet,” 2.

²⁷ Rasmussen, “InSTEDD Fact Sheet,” 3.

JTF-H's objectives were clear and limited in political aim, focusing specifically on relieving human suffering. JTF-H derived its objectives from presidential directives and USSOUTHCOM documents. USSOUTHCOM initially published an EXORD which stated:

“On order, USSOUTHCOM conducts foreign humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (FHA/DR) in support of USG relief efforts in Haiti in order to mitigate near term human suffering and accelerate recovery.”²⁸

USSOUTHCOM's later published operations order and other JTF-H products modify the objectives stating:

“JTF-H conducts HA/DR operations to support USG efforts in Haiti to mitigate near-term human suffering and accelerate relief efforts to facilitate transition to GoH, UN and USAID.”²⁹

JTF-H's ultimate operational objective was to mitigate human suffering as a result of the earthquake, but limited to the near term and focused on transitioning to non-military organizations. Additionally JTF-H specified intermediate operational

Table II: JTF-H Intermediate Operational Objectives

- Conduct security operations to enable distribution of HA/DR
- Develop situational understanding to speed delivery of essential relief supplies (water, food, medical)
- Establish C2, security and logistics architecture
- Enable mobility for USG and other HA/DR delivering elements
- Support unity of effort in delivering HA/DR assistance to affected areas
- Execute a pro-active Strategic Communication program

objectives to achieve their ultimate objective as seen in Table II.³⁰

Although the operational objective semantically developed over time, the

main objective never became political beyond the goal of relieving suffering.

Intermediate operational objectives also did not stray beyond those actions which

²⁸ Commander, US Southern Command, “161330Z JAN 10 CDR USSOUTHCOM HAITI EARTHQUAKE FOREIGN DISASTER RELIEF (FDR) EXORD”, 16 January 2010, 3.

²⁹ Commander Joint Task Force – Haiti, “261659R JAN 10 JTF-HAITI OPORD 01-10, OPERATION UNIFIED RESPONSE”, 26 January 2010, 5-6.

³⁰ Ibid.

needed to happen to achieve the ultimate operational objective. As seen in Operation ATALANTA, these objectives are both clear and allow military and non-military forces to agree easily.

The actions of JTF-H in cooperation and coordination in Haiti were exemplary. LTG Ken Keen, the commander of JTF-H, has approximately seven years of experience in Central and South America and was a personal friend of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) commander, MG Floriano Peixoto.³¹ LTG Keen and MG Peixoto made the decision to bring together the MINUSTAH and JTF-H staffs to ensure that priorities were nested.³² JTF-H also created a Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC) as the hub for military to non-military coordination and cooperation.³³ JTF-H HACC established itself in two locations to facilitate coordination: a main HACC at the US Embassy and a Forward HACC at the UN Log Base to coordinate with the UN cluster system of organizing.³⁴ The US Embassy HACC was the primary coordinator to US military forces, while HACC Forward coordinated with the UN. In this manner, US military forces could allow NGOs to coordinate with them in the manner most desired by the NGO.

The Haiti earthquake response by USSOUTHCOM and JTF-H is one of the best current models of crisis response using ICTs. As the lead agency for the Haitian relief effort, USAID rapidly partnered and met with multiple NGOs who could provide software and manning to allow Haitian citizens to communicate with recovery teams. Many of these agencies had previously worked together in simulations such as *Strong Angel*. The *Strong*

³¹ USSOUTHCOM, “Deputy Commander’s Biography,” <http://www.southcom.mil/appssc/pages/dcdrBio.php> (accessed 11 April 2011) and Keen, et al, “Foreign Disaster Response: Joint Task Force Haiti Observations,” *Military Review* XC, no.6 (November - December 2010): 90.

³² Keen, *Military Review*, 90

³³ JTF-H HACC, “SCJ9 - MUB Update - 25 Jan 10 – 1600 Final,” Powerpoint Presentation, available at <https://www.cimicweb.org/cmo/haiti/Crisis%20Documents/Forms/AllItems.aspx> under “HACC Operation Unified Response” (accessed 11 April 2011).

³⁴ Ibid.

Angel exercises were a series of disaster relief simulations aimed at bringing together multiple commercial, relief, and military organizations to test systems and build relationships.³⁵ SOUTHCOM and USAID facilitated the NGOs entry into Haiti and establishment of operations centers. Haitian citizens could use a Short Message Service (SMS) text message sent to a four-digit phone number to transmit their situation. The SMS message then went to a central server that would feed the message into a variety of ICT systems, creating mapping data and digital text. The information gained through the network was then passed on to JTF-H for action to assist Haitian citizens and NGOs.³⁶ Key to allowing military to non-military sharing was SOUTHCOM's decision to publish an unclassified operations order, spoken to by BG David Garza, SOUTHCOM Chief of Staff:

“...the SOUTHCOM Headquarters decided to classify our Operations Order as UNCLASSIFIED. This classification gave us ease of transmission across the military, civilian sectors and with our partner nations. The other reason is that General Fraser has on a daily basis established a drum beat of mutual support and communications connectivity with all stakeholders.”³⁷

Both the technologies to communicate and the decision by SOUTHCOM and JTF-H to be open allowed disaster relief operations to be better facilitated. Until military forces can establish stronger communications architecture over time, NGO ICTs can fill the gap to enable quick response immediately during a crisis.

Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE demonstrates that clear objectives, operational leadership, and KM/IM significantly enabled success in saving lives. US

³⁵ Donna Miles, "Strong Angel III Tests Military-Civil Disaster Relief," August 2006, <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=567> (accessed 19 September 2010).

³⁶ Linton Wells and Lou Elin Dwyer. "STAR-TIDES: Haiti earthquake response teams use STAR-TIDES model to facilitate coordination and relief operations." *CHIPS*, XXVIII, no. III (July – September 2010): 39-41. Under "Archives.aspx," <http://www.chips.navy.mil/> (accessed 24 February 2011).

³⁷ David Garza, "Interview with BGen David Garza, USSOUTHCOM Chief of Staff, 3 February 2010," quoted in Joint Center for Operational Analysis, *USSOUTHCOM and JTF-Haiti...Some Challenges and Considerations in Forming a Joint Task Force*, JCOA Report (Washington, DC: Joint Forces Command, 24 June 2010), 7.

military forces used their comparative advantage in rapid logistics capability, while NGOs helped to craft the KM/IM architecture to allow communication between all participants in the operation. US military forces relatively rapid departure and handover to UN forces meant that arguments over long term objectives between actors in the DR operation were avoided.

Lessons Learned

The clarity of operational objectives in war directly informs the ability of the operational commander to organize a command structure, establish ROE, and allocate resources. Primacy of the objective continues to be important in HA/DR operations, especially with regards to the duration of the operation. Objectives in HA/DR operations need to remain focused solely on the relief of human suffering. In neither case study did the operational mandate extend into “nation building” or building capacity of a host government. While these effects may result from externally assisted HA/DR operations, they should not be the goal. Relief of human suffering is an objective that many states and organizations can support. As soon as objectives stray into the direction of creating governments, disarming armed groups, or policing a country, coalitions and partnerships can fracture. EUNAVFOR commanders have no doubts about their mandate and ROE in the Gulf of Aden or Indian Ocean.³⁸ Operational leaders in Haiti also understood their relationship with MINUSTAH as a supporting command.

Operational leadership is at least as important in HA/DR, if not more so than in conventional military operations. Operational leaders in HA/DR operations must be in constant communication with all actors in the area of operations. EUNAVFOR leaders have

³⁸ Philip Jones, “Testimony,” United Kingdom House of Lords, *Combating Somali Piracy: the EU’s Naval Operation Atalanta*, 12th Report of Session, 2009-2010, 2-11, <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200910/ldselect/ldeucom/103/103.pdf> (accessed 11 March 2011).

both the authority and the ability to communicate with their non-military counterparts. EUNAVFOR leaders visit the WFP headquarters to ensure unity of effort.³⁹ Significant to the success of government and NGO cooperation during the Haitian relief efforts was the positive attitude of the JTF-Haiti commanders towards partnership with NGO. LTG Keen observed:

“I learned rather quickly in the aftermath of this catastrophe that if you can win NGO support, you can achieve results...Their situational awareness is unequaled, and this makes them a valuable source of information. We realized that if an IDP camp was to escape the elements of rain and disease without casualties, it would require the NGOs and the camp managers to make it happen.”⁴⁰

LTG Keen’s specific experience in the theater of operations and with the personalities involved directly informed his ability to gain unity of effort. LTG Keen again speaks to the necessity of communication:

“In a permissive humanitarian environment, the art of communicating can either make or break you. Diplomacy rules here and it doesn’t matter at what level.”⁴¹

Knowledge management enables HA/DR operations by creating a common operational picture for all participants and exposing information to recently arrived participants. One of the basic tenants of knowledge management is to change implicit knowledge into explicit knowledge. Different forms of explicit knowledge need to be combined with other explicit knowledge to create greater understanding of the whole

³⁹ EUNAVFOR-Somalia, “EU NAVFOR’s Deputy Commander visits WFP headquarters,” 5 October 2010, <http://www.eunavfor.eu/2010/10/eu-navfor%20%99s-deputy-commander-visits-wfp-headquarters/>, (accessed 2 May 2011).

⁴⁰ Ken, Keen, “KLE – A Necessary Requisite,” April 2010, <http://www.dodlive.mil/index.php/2010/04/kle-a-necessary-requisite/>, accessed, 9 September 2010.

⁴¹ Ken, Keen, “KLE – A Necessary Requisite.”

picture.⁴² To gain unity of effort in HA/DR operations, military forces must enable two types of knowledge transfers. First, transfer of information between active participants. Second, transfer of expert and external knowledge from outside of area of operations.⁴³ Operations ATALANTA and UNIFIED RESPONSE demonstrate these transfers. First, both operations relied on “serial transfers” of knowledge. Serial transfer is the process where explicit and implicit knowledge is gained in one context and used in the future in a slightly different context. JTF-H’s HACC and EUNAVFOR’s MSC-HOA are both methods of serial knowledge transfer to inform all participants about the operational picture. HA/DR operations need to engage in “expert transfer” of knowledge as well. Expert transfer is a knowledge transfer which involves gaining expert knowledge from outside of the organization working on the task.⁴⁴ Due to a lack of Creole speakers in US NGO and government operations centers in Haiti, NGOs developed a network of Creole speakers across the world using the Skype VOIP system and translated messages.⁴⁵ To enable operational leadership to communicate, allow military to non-military sharing, and gain expert knowledge, KM/IM systems must be robust in DR operations. Military forces need to be willing to share and open networks to all actors in a HA/DR environment.

IV. Conclusions and Recommendations

- 1. US GCCs need to study and plan for command structure, operational leadership, and KM/IM structures for HA/DR in their AOR now, prior to a crisis. The J3, J5, and J6 are particularly important to this process.*

⁴² Jatinder Gupta, Sushil K. Sharma, and Jeffery Hsu, “An Overview of Knowledge Management,” in *Creating Knowledge Based Organizations*, ed. Jatinder N. D. Gupta et al. (Hershey, PA: Idea Group Publishing, 2004), 3-5.

⁴³ Ibid, 15.

⁴⁴ Ibid, 16.

⁴⁵ Dwyer, Wells, “STAR-TIDES: Haiti earthquake response teams use STAR-TIDES model to facilitate coordination and relief operations”

LTG Keen's personal experiences made him an excellent candidate for command of the Haiti operation. GCCs should leverage the experience of Special Operations Forces in their regions. Preference should be given to SOF officers for command of HA/DR operations given their varied experience. GCCs should designate those leaders best equipped to lead HA/DR operations prior to a crisis. Operational leaders in HA/DR operations need to conduct battlefield circulation as much, if not more than operational leaders in conventional military operations to continue to transmit the message of cooperation with non-military organizations.

Although ICTs represent a technological innovation to share information, the key to using them effectively is people. People are the subject matter experts on deploying and networking information sharing systems, and people are needed to staff the system. To use the Haiti disaster response model for in other crises, GCCs needs to be prepared to fund the movement and sustainment of a sizeable group of civilians. GCCs can be a key facilitator in transporting and deploying civilian experts from the US or Europe to a central location for establishment of the DR KM/IM network.

Translation is a key component to information sharing during crisis response. The Haiti model used Skype as a method to create a network of translators. GCCs could assist the development of such a network by using their social media sites to advertise a need for translators and create a digital network of interpreter first responders prior to a crisis. Since this information sharing network will have to be unsecure, GCCs should view the creation of this type of network as limited to humanitarian assistance and disaster response.

When a JTF is created for a crisis response, social media and ICT coordination functions should reside in the J3 section, staffed by personnel from the J3, J6, J9, and PAO.

J6 would provide initial set up of the cell, while the J9 and J3 man the cell, coordinate with NGOs and provide information to the main Joint Operations Center (JOC).

2. *US Joint Doctrine confuses the primacy of the objective for HA/DR operations and needs to be amended to clarify the objectives of HA/DR operations and separate policy and security issues from the relief of human suffering*

US joint doctrine definitions have confused the issue of military-NGO cooperation. The table shows four definitions of terms related to HA/DR operations:

stability operations — An overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. (JP 3-0) ⁴⁶	humanitarian assistance — Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. Humanitarian assistance provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration. The assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance. Also called HA . (JP 3-57) ⁴⁷
foreign disaster relief — Prompt aid that can be used to alleviate the suffering of foreign disaster victims. Normally it includes humanitarian services and transportation; the provision of food, clothing, medicine, beds, and bedding; temporary shelter and housing; the furnishing of medical materiel and medical and technical personnel; and making repairs to essential services. See also foreign disaster . (JP 3-29) ⁴⁸	foreign humanitarian assistance — Department of Defense activities, normally in support of the United States Agency for International Development or Department of State, conducted outside the United States, its territories, and possessions to relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation. Also called FHA . See also foreign assistance . (JP 3-29) ⁴⁹

Table III: US Joint Definitions of HA/DR Terms

The term “stability operations” includes both security tasks and the term “humanitarian relief” which is not defined in joint doctrine. “Foreign disaster relief” applies to the aid given, while “humanitarian assistance” apparently includes disaster relief.

⁴⁶ Chairman, US Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Joint Publication (JP) 1-02 (Washington, DC: CJCS, 31 January 2011), 344.

⁴⁷ *Ibid*, 167.

⁴⁸ *Ibid*, 144.

⁴⁹ *Ibid*.

“Foreign humanitarian assistance” differs from “humanitarian assistance” in that it is only outside the borders of the US, although “humanitarian assistance” alludes to the “host nation” implying execution outside of the US. The possibility of confusion generated by these terms will not help the operational commander. Given that the most unified HA/DR operations are those without policy objectives related to security, HA/DR terminology should be removed from the definition of stability operations. US doctrine should reflect HA/DR operations as completely apolitical to remove barriers to military/non-military cooperation.

V. Final remarks:

Regardless of the future security environment, military forces will conduct HA/DR operations. As the best organized and equipped of government agencies, the military will be relied upon to provide the manpower, equipment, and organizational and planning ability needed to effectively respond to crises. Operating in a non-security oriented environment requires a reorientation of the mindset towards non-military actors. Through open communication and extensive liaison, military forces can cooperate with non-military, non-government organizations. This cooperation requires a clear, limited policy to strategy to operations linkage and creative, open minded leadership to operate inside that linkage. Increases in ICTs and understanding knowledge transfers can inform operational leadership to improve unity of effort. In the uncertain future we face from both man’s political designs and nature’s wrath, saving lives and relieving suffering require us all to work together.

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